INTRODUCTION
In the arena of bioethical enquiry, one of the newest and most controversial subjects is embryonic stem cell (ES cell) Church, the use of aborted human fetuses as sources of harvested ES cells is a clear moral wrong. However, there is ambiguity concerning the morality of artificially producing human zygotes 2 which are never destined to be implanted into a uterus; being created for the sole purpose of harvesting their ES cells.
In order to respond to such ambiguity, as well as that surrounding the moral permissibility of other biomedical procedures, I wish to enquire into the beginnings of human personhood. This enquiry is different from the question "When does a human life begin?" As far as human "life" per se, it is, for the most part, uncontroversial among the scientific and philosophical community that life begins at the moment when the genetic information contained in the sperm and ovum combine to form a genetically unique cell. However, what is controversial is whether this genetically unique cell should be considered a human person. In what follows, I will examine both philosophical and scientific endeavors to provide an answer to the question, "When did I, a human person, begin?" The 3 answer to this question will serve as a basic premise for arguing whether the artificial production of embryos for the sole purpose of harvesting their ES cells, as well as certain other biomedical procedures, 3 are morally permissible.
Thomas Aquinas provides a plausible foundation for building a theory of human personhood and its origin due to his persistent focus on the human person as essentially a being composed of the integrated components of intellective soul and material body. Aquinas, unlike many others of his time, 4 argued that one must consider both the body and the soul of a human being, understanding their interaction, in order to have a complete theory of human personhood.
Thus, my approach to the question of human personhood within a
Thomistic framework will consider both biological and metaphysical aspects of human persons. As Philip Smith states, "The fact that Aquinas' metaphysics is grounded in the order that reason discovers in nature rather than imposes upon it, not only allows, but demands that the scientific information on fetal development be incorporated into the discussion on the beginnings of personhood."
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To answer the biological aspect of the question of when human personhood begins, I will refer to the arguments presented by Eric Olson in his book, The Human Animal 6 and Norman Ford in his book, When Did I Begin? 7 I utilize these two thinkers because they, as I, approach biological data on the beginnings of human life with an eye to the issue of when personhood begins. I 4 will relate the considered arguments and positions to Aquinas' account of body and soul.
THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS
A necessary preamble to this discussion is to present and explain the key relevant concepts in Aquinas' metaphysics. The first section concerns Aquinas' understanding of the relationship between form (soul) and matter (body). This section will include Aquinas' contention that a material human body and the soul (form) which defines it are inseparably linked. The second section will consider
Aquinas' metaphysics of ensoulment, i.e., the instantiation of a human soul in a human biological organism. In the third section, I will give Aquinas' definition of "person" and briefly compare it with two other conceptions of "person" from Peter Singer and Michael Tooley. This metaphysical groundwork will define the necessary conditions to validly assert, from a Thomistic perspective, whether or not there is a human soul, and thus a human person, present at the earliest stages of biological life.
Form and Matter
Thomas Aquinas held an Aristotelian view with respect to the nature of human persons. The primary characteristic of this view is that a human person is essentially a composite unified being. This means that the essence of human personhood is an integration of both of its required components: form and matter.
Form is understood in Aristotelianism to be the defining principle by which 5 matter takes on a certain individuated nature. Form is basically that by which an instance of matter possesses certain defining qualities (e.g., having a particular shape, size, color, texture, smell, ability to reproduce, ability to sense, ability to form abstract concepts, etc.) in an integrated unity. For Aquinas and Aristotle, matter cannot exist without form, and form does not exist apart from matter.
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With respect to living beings, there are three types of form and they are all referred to by both Aristotle 9 and Aquinas 10 by the term 'soul' (psuche and anima, respectively). Soul is best characterized as the dynamic unifying principle of a living being's activities and end (telos). 11 There are three different types of soul:
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. Each of these types is defined by its respective set of powers. All three types function as the organizing principle of matter.
The vegetative soul is found in plants and all higher biological organisms. 12 It endows them with the powers of life, nutrition, and growth. The sensitive soul is found in animals and human beings. It endows them with the powers of sensation, imagination, and awareness of particular objects. The intellective soul is found only in human beings and is the principle of endowment of the powers of rational thought, as well as the human biological powers proper to the functioning of the intellective soul.
The soul is the form of the body for living beings. It is the organizing principle of all physical aspects of living beings. All types of form are essentially 6 integrated with the matter they inform. They cannot exist separate from matter.
Thus, the essence of human personhood requires both the form and the matter together; i.e., the presence of a human person requires that there be matter (a body) organized as an individual human body by an intellective soul (the appropriate form of a human person).
Another aspect of the Thomistic/Aristotelian relationship of form and matter is that form individuates matter. Without form, there is no distinction between one instance of matter and another. In fact, Aquinas contends that such "prime matter" (i.e., matter without form) does not exist. All instances of matter are informed and each is thus a separate individual from other instances of informed matter. Therefore, to say that there is an instance of informed matter is to say that there is an individual substance. The body of a plant, informed by a vegetative soul, is distinct from the body of another plant which is informed by a numerically different vegetative soul. With respect to humans, a human body which is informed by an intellective soul is distinct from another human body which is informed by a numerically distinct intellective soul. Aquinas are in agreement that the essential qualities, or powers, of personhood need not be actualized for a person to be present. Tooley and Aquinas also seem to be in agreement when Tooley asserts at least one necessary condition for personhood: "a continuing mental substance." 18 Although Aquinas does not hold the human intellective soul (considered by itself) to be a "substance," in the technical Aristotelian understanding of that term, he does contend that psychological (mental) continuity is necessary for personhood in the sense that there must be the continuous presence of an human intellective soul.
Metaphysics of Ensoulment
With this Thomistic metaphysical framework in mind, I will now present the arguments of Olson and Ford as to when the biological requirements of ensoulment are met. The basic requirement is an ongoing ,ontologically unique, biological organism which, in its activities, exemplifies the powers of the intellective soul.
OLSON AND THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH
Olson holds that the continuous existence of a human biological organism is necessary and sufficient for personhood. In a Thomistic framework, however, I
contend that the continuous existence of a human biological organism is necessary, but not sufficient, for personhood. As already described above, for Aquinas, the instantiation of an intellective soul informing the biological organism is also necessary for personhood. However, while I disagree with Olson on this point, his arguments for the beginning of the continuous existence of a The key to Olson's argument for the beginning of a human person not occurring before this point in fetal development is the totipotency of the mass of cells that make up the blastocyst before it becomes implanted in the uterine wall.
"Totipotency" means that, prior to implantation, each cell or group of cells has the power to separate from the rest of the zygote, divide by cellular mitosis, and develop into a multicellular organism. It is due to this totipotency of preimplantation cells that identical twins, triplets, etc., are able to occur. One or more cells break away from the cluster, divide (mitosis), and develop into a second (or third, fourth, etc.) organism. Since each cell or group of cells is its 12 own unique individual biological entity and has the capacity to separate and develop into a distinct multicellular biological organism, it cannot be said that there is already an individual human organism at this point. In potentiality, there are, practically speaking, one or a few individual human organisms present.
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One could respond to this conclusion by asserting that there is one individual human organism in potentiality, if the case were that twinning did not occur. I argue that this response fails because, before the point at which twinning becomes impossible, there is both the potential for a single organism and for multiple organisms to develop. Neither potentiality is any more potential, or closer to being actual, than the other. In other words, any zygote has the potential to twin, prior to implantation. One may argue that one of the potentialities would have an advantage over the other if there were some type of genetic encoding for twinning that determines whether or not it will occur. However, at the present time of scientific discovery, it is not known whether such is the case or not. The first cell which results after fertilization is complete has a unique genetic identity and a unique ontological identity as a biological cell. However, it does not have a unique ontological identity as a human being. This is due to there existing, after the first mitotic event, two cells which have the same genetic identity, but are ontologically distinct. The same follows for every event of cellular mitosis until the point is reached when mitosis can no longer occur which results in ontologically distinct beings, i.e., identical twinning is no longer possible.
FORD AND THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH
14 One could counter that twinning does not lead to the conclusion that there is not an ontologically unique individual to begin with, if it were the case that the second (twin) ontological individual grows out of the material of the first without the first losing its ontological status. I contend, however, that this does not seem to be a likely case since there is no way to differentiate the two different ontologies. Cells remain undetermined for quite some time as to where they will go and what role they will play in the developing organism. The same indeterminism can come into play in some cases of twinning in which the two organisms share cell clusters for a great deal of the developmental process. 26 To which organism each set of cells will ultimately go is largely undetermined.
Therefore, there is both a sharing of ontology and a lack of completely individuated ontology in each organism. will not, in the end, form part of the embryo proper, but will form extraembryonic material. 33 Thus, it still cannot be said that there is a unique individual entity until all the cells which will contribute to the formation of the embryo proper are determined to that end and no other. Prior to strict cell determination, there are more than one entity present in the zygote, embryo proper and extraembryonic material, and they are not able to be completely differentiated from each other.
Another way of approaching this issue is to argue that the entire "new biological entity" 34 is the human organism. Couldn't it be said that the embryo proper, placenta, umbilical cord, and any other extraembryonic biological material together constitute one unique human organism? If this is the case, then the human organism, at the moment of birth, removes a significant portion of itself (the embryo proper) from the placenta, and, after a time, completely sheds the placenta and umbilical cord which are no longer necessary.
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Ford, however, rejects this possible scenario because he sees no reason for considering the placenta as a part of the embryo proper that is discarded after birth. He cites two supporting reasons: 1. When a baby is still-born, we do not 17 mourn for the placenta and bury it along with the rest of the baby; 2. In some nonhuman mammals, a placenta will form even in cases where no embryo is present.
Thus, the placenta is best considered as a separate biological entity from the embryo proper. It is the embryo proper alone that will continue to develop into an infant and adult human being. The answer is that a definitive human body exists when there is biological material present that will, in the absence of interruption in the natural course, develop into an adult human biological organism and nothing else. As Ford argues, before the formation of the primitive streak, there is biological material that will naturally form things other than an adult human biological organism, e.g., extraembryonic material or a possible second adult human biological organism.
The presence of such material that does not belong to the embryo proper may prima facie not seem like a threat to the metaphysical argument that there is a "definitive" embryonic human body present amidst the extra material. One may argue that the inability to differentiate which cells of the zygote will constitute extraembryonic material and which will constitute the embryo proper is merely an epistemological problem and has no bearing on the metaphysical reality that there is a definitive human body present within the cell cluster. I disagree with such an argument, because the epistemological problem of differentiating which cells will constitute which entity (embryo proper, twin embryo, or extraembryonic material)
is due to the lack of a metaphysical determining factor for cell differentiation.
Contra what my interlocutor may argue, there is no metaphysical fact-of-thematter concerning which cells constitute the embryo proper which is merely not 20 known, or knowable, by current scientific understanding. The only metaphysical fact-of-the-matter concerning the differentiation of pre-implantation cells is that they are not differentiated in any way. It is merely due to chance occurrence that some cells, rather than others, will end up in the proper position to be cells of the embryo proper. 39 There is no hidden metaphysical mechanism of cell determination present in the zygote.
Accepting Ford's and Olson's accounts of when occurs the instantiation of a unique individual human biological organism which will maintain biological continuity across its development into an infant and adult, my final concern is to relate this biological answer to a psychological answer to the question of when personhood begins. I have argued above that, for a Thomist, a complete account of personhood must include both the biological and psychological factors that constitute a human person. The soul is the set of endowments and powers which actualize the biological and psychological activities that constitute the human body and intellect.
THOMISTIC ANSWER TO WHEN ENSOULMENT OCCURS
According to Ford and Olson, the human soul is instantiated at the end of implantation when the primitive streak begins to form. It is only at this point that the activities proper to the human intellective soul are observed. 40 However, it is not necessary to say that all of the soul's powers must be actualized at that moment. The actualization of the soul's different powers occurs as the 21 corresponding biological capacities develop. Another reason that it is not until the point of implantation that there can be said to be instantiation of the intellective soul is due to the requirement that there be individuated matter present. Prior to implantation, the cluster of cells do not form a unique individual entity. Rather, they are a collection of several individual entities. Because of the remaining possibility of twinning, there cannot be said to be one individual instance of matter, i.e., one body. There are possibly two or more bodies present.
Therefore, it cannot be said that there is one intellective soul informing the matter of the zygote. Once implantation occurs, twinning is no longer possible, and cell differentiation between the embryo proper and extraembryonic material is complete, the instance of matter that is the embryo proper can be said to be an individual instance of matter, informed by one form, viz., the intellective soul.
At the formation of the primitive streak, there is a living biological organism, capable of nutrition and growth, 41 developing the earliest biological tools necessary for sensation, imagination, and rational thought (being that all of these powers are tied to the brain and spinal cord that develop from the primitive streak). Therefore, at this point, the powers proper to the vegetative type of soul are actualized (life, nutrition, growth) and the powers proper to the sensitive type of soul are informing the biological organism to develop the tools necessary to actualize the powers of sensation and imagination. Also, the powers proper to the intellective type of soul are informing the same development in order to actualize 22 the power of rational thought. 42 The specific powers of sensation and intellection are not themselves actualized until the required organs begin to function.
However, the soul itself is active by informing the body to develop the required organs. Therefore, I conclude that the human person is instantiated as an individual complete biological organism with the powers of life, sensation, and rational thought (i.e., a being with both a body and a human intellective soul) at the moment the primitive streak begins to form, division of the organism (i.e., twinning) is no longer possible, and cells which form the embryo proper are determined to that end and no other. Twinning is the key to determining an embryo's being an individual substance informed by an intellective soul. Therefore, if it were discovered that twinning was still possible after implantation, say up until the second trimester; then, my argument would be that there is no intellective soul, or human person, present until the second trimester. Such a contention would present a problem of reconciling the lack of an intellective soul with the formation of the primitive streak, which would still occur at implantation and is an activity proper, I have argued above, to the intellective soul. However, the fact-of-the-matter is that 23 twinning is not possible after implantation and this corresponds to the formation of the primitive streak. That these two key events coincide is supporting evidence that both events are due to the fact that it is at this point that the intellective soul is instantiated in the embryonic matter.
The Nature of the Zygote
One matter I must now address concerns the nature of the zygote. Before there exists the developing individual biological organism, there exists, in its place, a cluster of cells, dividing and differentiating among themselves, which contain human DNA. Based on the evidence and arguments presented above, I
contend that this cell cluster can best be understood as human biological material, but not a unified living human organism. There is no soul informing this cluster of cells which constitute the zygote. It is merely biological material which contains human DNA. One reason I make this contention is that each cell of the cluster does not exist as an self-sutaining biological organism. Although each cell operates independently of the other cells in the cluster (and has the capacity to be separated from the other cells, divide, and form a new cell cluster), it is not a viable biological organism operating under its own internal life-principle (vegetative soul). If that were the case, then the cell would be able to take in nourishment and sustain its own existence as single-celled amoebae have the capacity to do. However, this is not the case. Removed from the special environment provided by the different components of the female reproductive 24 system, these cells would not be capable of sustaining their own existence and would quickly die.
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In adopting this stance toward the nature of the zygote, I am departing from strict Thomistic embryology. However, this departure is necessary and justified because Aquinas did not have the benefit of the embryological data available today. Aquinas 44 contends that there is a vegetative soul informing the zygote from the moment of conception. However, this vegetative soul is not numerically identical to the set of vegetative powers of the intellective soul; i.e.,
Aquinas contends that there is no intellective soul present at this point. Aquinas holds that this vegetative soul is later annihilated and replaced by a sensitive soul which includes both vegetative and sensitive powers. This soul is later annihilated and replaced by the intellective soul which includes vegetative, sensitive and intellective powers. As one can see, I could maintain allegiance to Aquinas' view and still hold the thesis that the zygote does not contain an intellective soul. However, holding that there is a vegetative soul informing the zygote implies that it is a unified living organism. This is inconsistent with the arguments of Ford and Olson, which have led to the conclusion that there is not a unified organism extant before implantation. Therefore, having adopted Ford and
Olson's position, I must depart from Aquinas on this issue. With these distinctions in mind, I assert that a sperm or ovum which exists independently of the other only has a passive potentiality for human personhood.
Two Types of Potentiality
I further contend that a fertilized zygote also has only a passive potentiality for human personhood, which implies that it is not yet an actual person. Why?
Because, in addition to unique genetic identity (which the zygote does possess), ongoing ontological identity is required (which the zygote does not possess since it is capable of twinning into two or more distinct ontologies); and the latter is only achieved by the addition of another positive causal factor, viz., the intellective soul.
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Therefore, until the moment when twinning is no longer possible, there is no actual human person present, because there is no basis for contending that there is a human soul informing the matter of the zygote. Nevertheless, it seems counter-intuitive to assert that both a sperm cell and a fertilized zygote share the 27 same type of potentiality. One tends to think that there is an important difference between the two types of biological material, even though they both require the addition of a key positive causal factor to become a unified human biological organism.
Tooley offers a solution to this dilemma by recognizing that there is a range of passive potentiality. Two things may both have only a passive potentiality to be something else, but one of the two may be closer to actualizing that potentiality than the other. How? One may have a need of fewer positive causal factors to fulfill its potentiality. In this case, the sperm first requires union with an ovum, and then instantiation of an intellective soul, to fulfill its potentialty for human personhood. The fertilized zygote has already achieved union with an ovum, it requires only the instantiation of the intellective soul to fulfill its potentiality. Thus, it could be contended, in agreement with the general intuition, that the fertilized zygote is, to a large degree, closer to being an actual human person than the sperm cell is. In fact, one could say that, since the zygote has the requisite DNA programming, it has an active potentiality for further biological development toward becoming the individual human biological organism which is informed by the intellective soul. However, it would still have only a passive potentiality for human personhood --since it requires the additional positive causal factor, viz., the intellective soul.
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 28
I will now proceed to address the ethical implications that follow from the conception of a zygote as having merely a passive potentiality for personhood. I wish to first note that, while the zygote is not a human person, it is still human in the sense that it contains a complete set of human DNA. Thus, as stated above, it could be said that the zygote, while having only a passive potentiality for personhood, has an active potentiality for biological development toward becoming a human biological organism which is informed by an intellective soul.
Due to this active potentiality for human biological development, I contend that the zygote should not be treated frivolously. 48 Nothing should interfere with the natural process of cell mitosis and differentiation unless it has a commensurate value. Defining what outcomes would be of commensurate value is a separate and daunting task. I follow with a couple examples of morally contentious acts which may have a commensurate value to the that of the zygote.
ES cell Research
Richard Doerflinger, the associate director of the pro-life activities office of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), has suggested that "supposing that the laboratory-produced stem-cell clusters are not true human embryos but only resemble them . . . the research could go forward." 
In Vitro Fertilization
Allowing a woman to conceive and bear children of her own and her partner's genetic makeup is a good thing. However, the process of in vitro fertilization and implantation of zygotes into the uterus, by which a woman who would otherwise be unable to conceive children of her own can do so, has the consequence of allowing the destruction of a small number of fertilized zygotes.
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But, if the above thesis is true, then there has been no loss of human life. What was destroyed in this process was human biological material which was not informed by an intellective soul. Such zygotes have none of the endowments associated with the intellective soul, even in active potentiality. At most, they are potentially (in the sense of passive potentiality) the recipients of an intellective soul --nothing more.
Furthermore, we can take into account the scientific evidence that a number of fertilized zygotes do not implant in the uterus following conception.
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The result is a natural (spontaneous) abortion. Since this is the case, it seems odd to believe that God (or whatever agent is responsible for creation) would permit the needless death of so many persons. It seems more reasonable to conceive of them as naturally rejected biological material --not persons.
Procured Abortion and Abortifacient Contraceptives
With respect to the abortion issue, my thesis is not practically applicable since procured abortions cannot occur until after the mother is aware that she is pregnant. Usually, implantation and the instantiation of an intellective soul have occurred by that point. However, my thesis could be used to argue in favor of the use of certain artificial contraceptives that are morally rejected otherwise. Some people accept the moral permissibility of using artificial contraceptives such as condoms or spermicidal jelly, but object to the use of an IUD or the "morning- 2 Such zygotes are "human" in that they contain human DNA. I am differentiating the terms 'embryo' and 'zygote' in the sense that 'embryo' refers to the developing human organism present after the blastocyst (cell cluster) has implanted in the uterine wall and begun to develop primitive tissues and organs. 'Zygote' refers to the pre-implantation biological material which consists of a cluster of cells from the moment of fertilization until the completion of the implantation process, at which time the embryo becomes distinct from the placenta and other extraembryonic material.
Thus, whenever I utilize the term 'zygote', the adjective 'pre-implantation' is understood.
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3 Some of the other issues I will address in this paper include in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of artificial contraceptives which function as abortifacients, i.e., cause the spontaneous abortion of a fertilized zygote to occur within the uterus.
4 E.g., the Manicheeans, who actually pre-date Aquinas by several centuries but still had influence in the 13th century, held that only the spirit (i.e., soul) defined what a human person is, that the physical body was a hindrance to that spirit, and that a person should make every attempt to remove themselves from their corporeal prison. They even went so far as to argue against procreation, claiming that it was a great evil to take part in trapping another spirit into a body. The seal informs the wax to take on a definite shape and texture that allows an observer to recognize the seal in the wax. The seal does not exist separate from the wax (one cannot physically abstract the seal from the wax), nor can the wax exist without having the shape and texture of the seal, or some other shape and texture.
9 Cf. Aristotle De Anima.
10 Cf. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Ia., Treatise on Man.
11 I am grateful to Fr. John Kavanaugh, S.J. for suggesting this characterization of "soul."
Understanding the soul in this way allows for it to be considered either as a substance, in the Aristotelian sense, or as merely a collection of attributes. For more on this debate concerning the nature of the soul in Aristotle, cf. Herbert Granger Aristotle's Idea of the Soul, Philosophical Studies Ser. 48 (Netherlands: Kluwer, 1996) .
12 I believe that if Aquinas and Aristotle had access to today's biological knowledge, they would be inclined to include bacteria, amoebae, and the like in their set of living organisms with a vegetative soul.
13 'Ensoulment' refers to the moment that the human soul informs the matter of the human body.
14 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Vol. 1, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, transs. 
